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ON FORWARD INDUCTION
SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Abstract. A player's pure strategy is called relevant for an outcome of a game in extensive
form with perfect recall if there exists a weakly sequential equilibrium with that outcome
for which the strategy is an optimal reply at every information set it does not exclude. The
outcome satis¯es forward induction if it results from a weakly sequential equilibrium in which
players' beliefs assign positive probability only to relevant strategies at each information set
reached by a pro¯le of relevant strategies. We prove that if there are two players and payo®s
are generic then an outcome satis¯es forward induction if every game with the same reduced
normal form after eliminating redundant pure strategies has a sequential equilibrium with
an equivalent outcome. Thus in this case forward induction is implied by decision-theoretic
criteria.
This paper has two purposes. One is to provide a general de¯nition of forward induction for
games in extensive form with perfect recall. As a re¯nement of weakly sequential equilibrium,
forward induction restricts the support of a player's belief at an information set to others'
strategies that are optimal replies to some weakly sequential equilibrium with the same
outcome, if there are any that reach that information set.
The second purpose is to resolve a conjecture by Hillas and Kohlberg [27, x13.6], of which
the gist is that `invariant backward induction outcomes satisfy forward induction.' An out-
come is invariant if every extensive form representing the same strategic situation (i.e. they
have the same reduced normal form) has a sequential equilibrium with an equivalent out-
come. For a game with two players and generic payo®s we prove that an invariant outcome
satis¯es forward induction.
The de¯nitions and theorem are entirely decision-theoretic. None of the technical devices
invoked in game theory, such as perturbations of players' strategies or payo®s, are needed.
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Sections 1 and 2 review the motivations for backward induction and forward induction.
Sections 3 and 4 provide general de¯nitions of forward induction and invariance. The formu-
lation and proof of the theorem are in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 examines an alternative
version of forward induction and Section 8 mentions economic applications.
1. Introduction
We consider a ¯nite game in extensive form speci¯ed by a game tree and an assignment
of players' payo®s to its terminal nodes. We assume perfect recall, so the game tree induces
a decision tree for each player. A pure strategy for a player speci¯es an action at each
of his information sets, and a mixed strategy is a distribution over pure strategies. A
mixed strategy induces a behavioral strategy that mixes anew according to the conditional
distribution among actions at each information set. Kuhn [34, Thm. 4] established for a
game with perfect recall that each behavioral strategy is induced by a mixed strategy, and
vice versa, inducing the same distribution on histories of play.
1.1. Backward Induction. Economic models formulated as games typically have multi-
ple Nash equilibria. Decision-theoretic criteria are invoked to select among Nash equilibria.
For a game in extensive form with perfect recall, the primary criterion is backward induc-
tion. Backward induction is invoked to eliminate Nash equilibria that depend on implausible
behaviors at information sets excluded by other players' equilibrium strategies. Thus back-
ward induction requires that a player's strategy remains optimal after every contingency,
even those that do not occur if all players use equilibrium strategies.
We assume here that backward induction is implemented by sequential equilibrium, es-
sentially as de¯ned by Kreps and Wilson [33, p. 872,882]. A sequential equilibrium is a pair
of pro¯les of players' behavioral strategies and beliefs. Here we de¯ne a player's belief to be
a conditional probability system (i.e. satisfying Bayes' Rule where well de¯ned) that at each
of his information sets speci¯es a distribution over pure strategies that do not exclude the
information set from being reached. A player's belief is required to be `fully consistent' in
that it is a limit of the conditional distributions induced by pro¯les of completely mixed or
equivalent behavioral strategies converging to the pro¯le of equilibrium strategies.
Kreps and Wilson's exposition di®ers in that for a player's belief at an information set
they use only the induced distribution over nodes in that information set. This restriction
cannot be invoked here since the purpose of forward induction is to ensure that the support
of a player's belief at an information set is con¯ned to others' optimal strategies wherever
possible, both before this information set as in their formulation in terms of nodes, and alsoON FORWARD INDUCTION 3
subsequently in the continuation of the game. Thus we use throughout the more general
speci¯cation that a player's belief is over strategies.
The de¯ning feature of a sequential equilibrium is the requirement that in the event an
information set is reached the player acting there behaves according to a strategy that in the
continuation is optimal given his belief about nature's and other players' strategies. A weakly
sequential equilibrium as de¯ned by Reny [41, p. 631] is the same as a sequential equilibrium
except that if a player's strategy excludes an information set from being reached then his
continuation strategy there need not be optimal. Section 3 provides a formal de¯nition of
weakly sequential equilibrium, which is then used in our de¯nition of forward induction.
1.2. Forward Induction. Kohlberg and Mertens [29, x2.3] emphasize that re¯ning Nash
equilibrium to sequential equilibrium is not su±cient to ensure that behaviors are justi¯ed by
plausible beliefs. McLennan [35, p. 901] and Reny [41, p. 639] propose di®erent algorithms
for iterative elimination of beliefs that are implausible according to some criterion. McLen-
nan de¯nes the set of justi¯able equilibria iteratively by excluding a sequential equilibrium
that includes a belief for one player that assigns positive probability at an information set to
an action of another player that is not optimal in any sequential equilibrium in the restricted
set obtained in the previous iteration. Reny de¯nes the set of explicable equilibria iteratively
by excluding a belief that assigns positive probability to a pure strategy that is not a best
response to some belief in the restricted set obtained in the previous iteration. Essentially,
these procedures apply variants of Pearce's [39] iterative procedure for identifying rational-
izable strategies to the more restrictive context of sequential equilibria. Somewhat similar
is Kohlberg and Mertens' [29, Prop. 6] proof that a stable set of Nash equilibria contains a
stable set of the game obtained by deleting a strategy that is not an optimal reply to any
equilibrium in the set.
Kohlberg and Mertens label this result Forward Induction but they and other authors
do not de¯ne the criterion explicitly. The main idea is the one expressed by Hillas and
Kohlberg [27, x42.13.6] in their recent survey: \Forward induction involves an assumption
that players assume, even if they see something unexpected, that the other players chose
rationally in the past," to which one can add that `and other players will choose rationally
in the future.' This is implicit since rationality presumes that prior actions are part of an
optimal strategy. See also Kohlberg [28] and van Damme [16].
Studies of particular classes of two-player games with generic payo®s reveal aspects of
what this idea entails. (A broader range of economic applications is described in Section 8.)
Outside-option games (as in Example 2.1 below) are addressed by van Damme [15, p. 485].
He proposes as a minimal requirement that forward induction should select a sequential4 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
equilibrium in which a player rejects the outside option if in the ensuing subgame there is
only one equilibrium whose outcome he prefers to the outside option. Signaling games (as in
Example 2.2 below) are addressed by Cho and Kreps [10, p. 202]. They propose an Intuitive
Criterion that is re¯ned further by Banks and Sobel [4, x3] to obtain criteria called Divinity
and Universal Divinity. These are obtained from iterative application of criteria called D1
and D2 by Cho and Kreps [10, p. 205] using algorithms akin to those of McLennan and Reny.
Brie°y, a sequential equilibrium satis¯es the Intuitive Criterion if no type of the sender
could obtain a payo® higher than his equilibrium payo® were he to choose a non-equilibrium
message and the receiver responds with an action that is an optimal reply to a belief that
imputes zero probability to nature's choice of those types that cannot gain from such a
deviation regardless of the receiver's reply. The D1 criterion requires that after an unexpected
message the receiver's belief imputes zero probability to a type of the sender for which there
is another type who prefers this deviation for a larger set of those responses of the receiver
that are justi¯ed by beliefs concentrated on types who could gain from the deviation and
response. See also Cho and Sobel [11] and surveys by van Damme [16], Fudenberg and
Tirole [18, x11], Hillas and Kohlberg [27], and Kreps and Sobel [32].
Battigalli and Siniscalchi [6, x5] derive the Intuitive Criterion from an epistemic model.
They say that a player strongly believes that an event is true if he remains certain of this
event after any history that does not contradict this event. They consider a signaling game
and a belief-complete space of players' types; e.g. one containing all possible hierarchies of
conditional probability systems (beliefs about beliefs) that satisfy a coherency condition. Say
that a player expects an outcome if his ¯rst-order beliefs are consistent with this outcome,
interpreted as a probability distribution on terminal nodes of the game tree. They show that
an outcome of a sequential equilibrium satis¯es the Intuitive Criterion under the following
assumption about the epistemic model:
The sender (1) is rational and (2) expects the outcome and believes that (2a) the receiver
is rational and (2b) the receiver expects the outcome and strongly believes that (2b.i) the
sender is rational and (2b.ii) the sender expects the outcome and believes the receiver is
rational. [6, Prop. 11]
The key aspect of this condition is the receiver's strong belief in the sender's rationality.
This implies that the receiver sustains his belief in the sender's rationality after any message
for which there exists some rational explanation for sending that message.
These contributions agree that forward induction should ensure that a player's belief
assigns positive probability only to a restricted set of strategies of other players. In each
case the restricted set comprises strategies that satisfy minimal criteria for rational play.ON FORWARD INDUCTION 5
1.3. Synopsis. In Section 2 we illustrate further the motivation for forward induction via
two standard examples from the literature. Our analyses of these examples anticipate the
theorem in Section 6 by showing that the result usually obtained by `forward induction
reasoning' is implied by the decision-theoretic criterion called invariance. Invariance requires
that the outcome should be una®ected by whether a mixed strategy is treated as a pure
strategy.
In Section 3 we propose a general de¯nition of forward induction. Its key component
speci¯es relevant pure strategies, i.e. those that satisfy minimal criteria for rational play
resulting in any given outcome|the induced probability distribution on terminal nodes of
the game tree and thus on possible paths of equilibrium play. Our de¯nition says that a
pure strategy is relevant if there is some weakly sequential equilibrium with that outcome for
which the strategy prescribes an optimal continuation at every information set the strategy
does not exclude.
2 We then say that an outcome satis¯es forward induction if it results from
a weakly sequential equilibrium in which each player's belief at an information set reached
by relevant strategies assigns positive probability only to relevant strategies.
In Section 6 we prove for general two-player games with generic payo®s that backward
induction and invariance imply forward induction. Thus for such games forward induction
is implied by standard decision-theoretic criteria.
2. Examples
In this section we illustrate the main ideas with two standard examples. These examples
illustrate how a test for forward induction can reject some sequential equilibria in favor of
others. Each example is ¯rst addressed informally using the `forward induction reasoning'
invoked by prior authors. The literature provides no formal de¯nition of forward induction
and we defer statement of our de¯nition to Section 3, but the main idea is evident from
the context. Each example is then analyzed using the decision-theoretic criterion called
invariance to obtain the same result. Invariance is de¯ned formally in Section 4 and invoked
in Theorem 6.1, but in these examples and the theorem it is su±cient to interpret invariance
as requiring only that the outcome resulting from a sequential equilibrium is not a®ected
by adding a redundant pure strategy, i.e. a pure strategy whose payo®s for all players are
replicated by a mixture of other pure strategies.
2See [21] for a version of this paper that obtains results for the weaker concept of relevant actions, rather
than strategies. We are indebted to a referee who provided an example of an irrelevant strategy that uses



















Figure 1. Two versions of a game with an outside option
2.1. An Outside-Option Game. The top panel of Figure 1 displays the extensive and
normal forms of a two-player game consisting of a subgame with simultaneous moves that
is preceded by an outside option initially available to player I. The component of Nash
equilibria in which player I chooses his outside option includes an equilibrium in which
player II's strategy has probability 2/3 of his left column and therefore player I is indi®erent
about deviating to his top row in the subgame, whereas there is no such equilibrium justifying
deviating to the bottom row. Alternatively, player I might anticipate that II will recognize
rejection of the outside option as a signal that I intends to choose the top row and therefore
II should respond with the left column.
To apply forward induction one excludes from the support of II's belief the dominated
strategy in which I rejects the outside option and chooses the bottom row in the subgame.
The test fails because then II is sure that if I rejects the outside option then he will play the
top row, and therefore II's optimal strategy is the left column, and anticipating this, player
I rejects the outside option.
As in Hillas [26, Figure 2], one can invoke invariance to obtain this conclusion. The bottom
panel of Figure 1 shows the expanded extensive form after adjoining the redundant strategy
in which, after tentatively rejecting the outside option, player I randomizes between the
outside option and the top row of the subgame with probabilities 3/4 and 1/4. Player II
does not observe which strategy of player I led to rejection of the outside option. In the
unique sequential equilibrium of this expanded game player I rejects both the outside option
and the redundant strategy and then chooses the top row of the ¯nal subgame.ON FORWARD INDUCTION 7
A lesson from this example is that an expanded game has imperfect information in the
sense that II has imperfect observability about whether I chose the redundant strategy. This
is signi¯cant for II because I retains the option to choose the bottom row in the subgame i®
he rejected the redundant strategy. Therefore, even though subgame perfection could su±ce
in the original game, in general one needs sequential equilibrium to analyze the expanded
game. Note too that addition of the redundant strategy alters equilibrium strategies but if
invariance is satis¯ed then the induced probabilities of actions along equilibrium paths are
preserved and thus so too is the predicted outcome. One could explicitly map equilibria of
an expanded game into induced behavioral probabilities of actions in the original game, but
we omit this complication.
2.2. A Signaling Game. The top panel of Figure 2 displays the two-player two-stage
signaling game Beer-Quiche studied by Cho and Kreps [10, xII] and discussed further by
Kohlberg and Mertens [29, x3.6.B] and Fudenberg and Tirole [18, x11.2].
Consider sequential equilibria with the outcome QQ-R; that is, both types W and S of
player I (the sender) choose Q and player II (the receiver) responds to Q with R and to B
with a probability of F that is > 1=2. The equilibria in this component are sustained by
player II's belief after observing B that imputes to I's type W a greater likelihood of having
deviated than to type S. In all these equilibria, B is not an optimal action for type W. But in
the equilibrium for which player II assigns equal probabilities to W and S after observing B
and mixes equally between F and R, type S is indi®erent between Q and B. If II recognizes
this as the source of I's deviation then he infers after observing B that I's type is S and
therefore chooses R. Alternatively, if player I's type is S then he might deviate to B in hopes
that this action will credibly signal his type, since his equilibrium payo® is 2 from Q but
he obtains 3 from player II's optimal reply R if the signal is recognized, but type W has
no comparable incentive to deviate|this is the `speech' suggested by Cho and Kreps [10,
p. 180,181] to justify their Intuitive Criterion.
One applies forward induction by excluding from the support of II's belief after observing
B those strategies that take action B when I's type is W. In fact, the sequential equilibria
in which both types of I choose Q do not survive this restriction on II's belief because II's
optimal response to B is then R, which makes it advantageous for player I's type S to deviate
by choosing B. Thus sequential equilibria with the outcome QQ-R do not satisfy forward
induction. This leaves only sequential equilibria with the outcome BB-R in which both types
of player I choose B and II chooses R after observing B.
As in Example 2.1 one can obtain this same conclusion by invoking invariance. The bottom








































Figure 2. Two versions of the Beer-Quiche game
player I that produces a randomization between B and Q with probabilities 1/9 and 8/9.
Denote by BQ player I's pure strategy that chooses B if his type is W and chooses Q if his
type is S, and similarly for his other pure strategies. The normal form of this expanded game
is shown in Table 1 with all payo®s multiplied by 10 (we intentionally omit the pure strategy
BX to keep the analysis simple). Now consider the following extensive form that has the
same reduced normal form. Player I initially chooses whether or not to use his pure strategy
QQ, and if not then subsequently he chooses among his other pure strategies BB, BQ, QB,
and QX. After each of these ¯ve pure strategies, the extensive form in the bottom panel
ensues, but with I's action dictated by his prior choice of a pure strategy. That is, nature
chooses I's type to be W or S, the selected pure strategy dictates the subsequent choice of
B or Q, and then player II (still having observed only which one of B or Q was chosen)
chooses F or R. At player I's information set where, after rejecting QQ, he chooses among
his other pure strategies, a sequential equilibrium requires that he assigns zero probability
to BQ because it is strictly dominated by QX in the continuation. At player II's information
set after observing B a sequential equilibrium requires that his behavioral strategy is an
optimal reply to some fully consistent belief about those strategies of player I that reachON FORWARD INDUCTION 9
B: F F R R
W S Q: F R F R
B B 9,1 9,1 29,9 29,9
B Q 0,1 18,10 2,0 20,9
Q B 10,1 12,0 28,10 30,9
Q Q 1,1 21,9 1,1 21,9
Q X 2,1 20,8 4,2 22,9














Figure 3. A signaling game with pooling and separating equilibria
this information set. But every mixture of I's pure strategies BB, QB, and QX implies that,
given his choice of B, the induced conditional probability that his type is S exceeds 9/10.
Therefore, player II's reply to B must be R in every sequential equilibrium of this extensive
form. Hence the sequential equilibria with outcome QQ-R are inconsistent with invariance,
in agreement with failure to satisfy forward induction.
A similar analysis applies to the game in Figure 3, which resembles games considered
in studies of signaling via costly educational credentials in labor markets as in Spence [42]
and Kreps [30, x17.2]. In this game forward induction rejects the outcome of the pooling
equilibrium in which both types of player I move right and II responds to right with up (and
to left with probability of up > 1=2), and accepts the outcome of the separating equilibrium
in which only I's top type moves right. As mentioned in Section 8, the most common use of
forward induction in economic models is to reject pooling equilibria in favor of a separating
equilibrium, although often what is actually assumed is a weaker implication of forward
induction.
The way in which invariance is invoked in Example 2.2 is indicative of the proof of Theorem
6.1 in Section 6.10 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
3. Definition of Forward Induction
In this section we propose a general de¯nition of forward induction for games in extensive
form with perfect recall. Appendix B describes a slightly stronger de¯nition for games in
normal form.
Our de¯nition of forward induction relies on the solution concept called weakly sequential
equilibrium by Reny [41, p. 631]. Recall from Section 1.1 that a weakly sequential equilibrium
is the same as a sequential equilibrium except that a player's strategy need not be optimal
at information sets it excludes. See Reny [41, x3,4] for an expanded justi¯cation of weakly
sequential equilibrium as the right concept for analysis of forward induction.
Our de¯nition di®ers from Reny's in that we interpret players' beliefs as specifying dis-
tributions over others' strategies. Beliefs over strategies typically encode more information
than necessary to implement sequential rationality, i.e. as in Kreps and Wilson [33], the
conditional distribution over nodes in an information set su±ces to verify optimality. How-
ever, it is only from a belief speci¯ed as a conditional distribution over strategies that one
can verify whether a player's belief recognizes the rationality of others' strategies. As Ex-
amples 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate, the purpose of forward induction as a re¯nement is to reject
outcomes that deter player I's deviation by the threat of II's response that is optimal for
II only because his belief does not recognize I's deviation as part of an optimal strategy for
some equilibrium with the same outcome. To reject such outcomes, it is su±cient that the
support of II's belief is con¯ned to I's pure strategies that are optimal replies at information
sets they do not exclude.
The following de¯nition is the analog of the de¯nitions in Kreps and Wilson [33] and
Reny [41].
De¯nition 3.1 (Weakly Sequential Equilibrium). A weakly sequential equilibrium is a pair
(b;¹) of pro¯les of players' behavioral strategies and beliefs. At each information set hn of
player n his behavioral strategy speci¯es a distribution bn(¢jhn) over his feasible actions, and
his belief speci¯es a distribution ¹n(¢jhn) over pro¯les of nature's and other players' pure
strategies that enable hn to be reached. These pro¯les are required to satisfy:
(1) Full Consistency: There exists a sequence fbkg of pro¯les of completely mixed behav-
ioral strategies converging to b and a sequence f¾kg of completely mixed equivalent
normal-form strategies such that for each information set of each player the condi-
tional distribution speci¯ed by ¹ is the limit of the conditional distributions obtained
from f¾kg.3
3The belief ¹n(¢jhn) might entail correlation; cf. Kreps and Ramey [31].ON FORWARD INDUCTION 11
(2) Sequential Rationality: For each player n and each information set hn that bn does
not exclude, each action in the support of bn(¢jhn) is part of a pure strategy that is
an optimal reply to ¹n(¢jhn) in the continuation from hn.
A sequential equilibrium is de¯ned exactly the same except that each player's actions must
be optimal at all his information sets, including those excluded by his equilibrium strategy.
We interpret forward induction as a property of an outcome of the game, de¯ned as follows.
De¯nition 3.2 (Outcome of an Equilibrium). The outcome of an equilibrium of a game in
extensive form is the induced probability distribution over the terminal nodes of the game
tree.
A key feature in the de¯nition of forward induction is the concept of a relevant strategy.
De¯nition 3.3 (Relevant Strategy). A pure strategy of a player is relevant for a given
outcome if there is a weakly sequential equilibrium with that outcome for which the strategy
at every information set it does not exclude prescribes an optimal continuation given the
player's belief there.
Thus a relevant strategy is optimal for some expectation about others' equilibrium play with
that outcome, and his beliefs at events after their deviations. For instance, in Example 2.2
of a signaling game, the strategy QB of the sender I in which type W chooses Q and type S
chooses B is relevant for the outcome QQ-R because it is an optimal reply to the sequential
equilibrium with that outcome in which the receiver II responds to B by using F and R with
equal probabilities. But the strategies BB and BQ are irrelevant because B is not an optimal
reply for I's type W to any sequential equilibrium with outcome QQ-R.
For the standard examples in Section 2 it is su±cient to interpret forward induction
as requiring merely that player II's belief at the information set excluded by I's equilibrium
strategy imputes positive probability only to the node reached by I's non-equilibrium relevant
strategy. For general games, however, a stronger requirement is desirable.
We propose a general de¯nition of forward induction that identi¯es those outcomes result-
ing from the conjunction of rational play and belief that others' play is rational, and thus
minimally consistent with Battigalli and Siniscalchi's [6] epistemic model of strong belief in
rationality. Because relevant strategies are optimal, hence rational, in some weakly sequen-
tial equilibrium with the same outcome, they are the minimal set for which one can require
the support of one player's belief to recognize the rationality of other players' strategies|
indeed that is the lesson from the standard examples in Section 2. Our proposed de¯nition
of a forward induction outcome therefore requires that the outcome results from a weakly12 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
sequential equilibrium in which every player maintains the hypothesis that other players are
using relevant strategies throughout the game, so long as that hypothesis is tenable.
To simplify terminology, say that an information set is relevant for an outcome if it is
not excluded by every pro¯le of relevant strategies. (This di®ers from Kuhn's [34, Def. 6]
and Reny's [41, p. 631] de¯nition of an information set that is relevant for a pure strategy
because the information set is not excluded by that strategy.) Then we de¯ne a forward
induction outcome as follows.
De¯nition 3.4 (Forward Induction). An outcome satis¯es forward induction if it results
from a weakly sequential equilibrium in which at every relevant information set the support
of the belief of the player acting there is con¯ned to pro¯les of nature's strategies and other
players' relevant strategies.
Section 7 compares this de¯nition with Reny's alternative interpretation. Applied to the
standard examples in Section 2, our de¯nition yields the conclusions obtained from `forward
induction reasoning' in the literature. For instance, in Example 2.2 of a signaling game, the
outcome QQ-R does not satisfy forward induction because the de¯nition requires that after
observing B player II assigns zero probability to I's irrelevant strategies BB and BQ, and thus
assigns positive probability only to I's relevant strategy QB that enables II's information set
B to be reached.
More generally, forward induction implies the Intuitive Criterion, D1, D2 (whose iterative
version de¯nes Universal Divinity) and Cho and Kreps' [10, x IV.5] strongest criterion, called
Never Weak Best Response (NWBR) as de¯ned for signaling games. These implications are
veri¯ed by showing that a strategy s of the sender is irrelevant if s prescribes that his type
t sends a message m that is not sent by any type in some weakly sequential equilibrium
with the given outcome, and the pair (t;m) satis¯es any of these criteria. For instance,
the criterion NWBR excludes the strategy s from the receiver's belief if the continuation
strategy m at information set t yields exactly the sender's type-contingent payo® from the
given outcome for some beliefs and optimal responses of the receiver only when some other
type t0 that could send m would get a type-contingent payo® that is higher than from the
designated outcome for the same or a larger set of the receiver's optimal responses. But this
condition implies that there is no weakly sequential equilibrium with the same outcome for
which m is an optimal action for type t. Were there such an equilibrium then the receiver
could use any such response at the o®-the-equilibrium-path information set m, but then type
t0 could obtain a superior payo® by sending m. Thus, m cannot be an optimal continuationON FORWARD INDUCTION 13
by type t in any weakly sequential equilibrium with the given outcome, and therefore s is
an irrelevant strategy.
4. Definition of Invariance
In this section we de¯ne invariance as a property of a solution concept. First we de¯ne
relations of equivalence between games and between outcomes of equivalent games.
Recall that a player's pure strategy is redundant if its payo®s for all players are replicated
by a mixture of his other pure strategies. From the normal form of a game one obtains its
reduced normal form by deleting redundant strategies. Thus the reduced normal form is the
minimal representation of the essential features of the strategic situation.
De¯nition 4.1 (Equivalent Games). Two games are equivalent if their reduced normal
forms are the same up to relabeling of strategies.
As speci¯ed in De¯nition 3.2, the outcome of an equilibrium of a game in extensive form
is the induced probability distribution on terminal nodes, and thus on the paths through
the tree. Associated with each outcome is a set of pro¯les of nature's and players' mixed
strategies that result in the outcome, and in turn each such pro¯le can be replicated by a
pro¯le of mixed strategies in the reduced normal form. Hence we de¯ne equivalent outcomes
as follows.
De¯nition 4.2 (Equivalent Outcomes of Equivalent Games). Outcomes of two equivalent
games are equivalent if they result from the same pro¯le of mixed strategies of their reduced
normal form.
Trivially, the outcome of any Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the outcome of a Nash
equilibrium of any equivalent game. For any solution concept that is a re¯nement of Nash
equilibrium, we de¯ne invariance as follows.
De¯nition 4.3 (Invariant Outcome). An outcome is invariant for a solution concept if
every equivalent game has an equivalent outcome of an equilibrium selected by the solution
concept.
This de¯nition is used in Section 6 where the solution concept is sequential equilibrium.
Existence of invariant outcomes of sequential equilibria is implied by Mertens' [36] demon-
stration that one is included among outcomes of a stable set of Nash equilibria.4
4In [20] we prove that if a solution concept satis¯es invariance and a condition called strong backward
induction then it selects sets of equilibria that are stable in the weaker sense de¯ned by Kohlberg and
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5. Formulation
In this section we introduce notation used in the proof of the theorem in Section 6.
Let ¡ be a game in extensive form with perfect recall. For each player n let Hn be the
collection of his information sets, and let Sn;Bn and §n be his sets of pure, behavioral
and mixed strategies. A pure strategy chooses an action at each information set in Hn, a
behavioral strategy chooses a distribution over actions at each information set, and a mixed
strategy chooses a distribution over pure strategies. We say that a pure strategy enables an
information set if the strategy's prior actions do not exclude the information set from being
reached, and similarly for behavioral and mixed strategies.
Let §(P) and B(P) be the sets of Nash equilibria of ¡ represented as pro¯les of mixed
and behavioral strategies, respectively, that result in the outcome P. Let BM(P) be the set
of weakly sequential equilibria whose outcome is P, where each (b;¹) 2 BM(P) consists of a
pro¯le b 2 B(P) of players' behaviorial strategies and a pro¯le ¹ of players' fully consistent
beliefs. As in De¯nition 3.1, in each weakly sequential equilibrium (b;¹) the belief of a
player n at his information set hn 2 Hn is a probability distribution ¹n(¢jhn) over nature's
and other players' pure strategies that reach hn.
Given an outcome P, say that a P-path through the game tree is one that terminates
at a node in the support of P. Actions on P-paths are called equilibrium actions. Let
Hn(P) be the collection of player n's information sets that intersect P-paths. Obviously,
every equilibrium in B(P) prescribes the same mixture at each information set in Hn(P). Let
Sn(P) ½ Sn comprise those pure strategies sn of player n such that sn chooses an equilibrium
action at every information set in Hn(P) that sn enables. Note that if ¾ 2 §(P) then the
support of ¾n is contained in Sn(P). Moreover, every strategy in Sn(P) is optimal against
every equilibrium in §(P). Partition the complement Tn(P) ´ Sn n Sn(P) into subsets Rn
and Qn of n's pure strategies that are relevant and irrelevant, respectively, for P. Note that
Sn(P) may contain irrelevant strategies.
De¯ne an equivalence relation among player n's pure strategies as follows. Two strategies
are equivalent if they prescribe the same action at each information set in Hn(P). Let En(P)
be the set of equivalence classes. Denote a typical element of En(P) by En and let En(sn) be
the equivalence class that contains sn. Let E±
n(P) be the subcollection of equivalence classes
that contain strategies in Sn(P). Thus, any strategy that is used in some equilibrium in
§(P) belongs to some equivalence class in E±
n(P), while any strategy that is in Tn(P) does
not.
If Rn is not empty then for each probability ± 2 (0;1) let t±
n be a mixed strategy of n of the
form [1¡±]s¤
n+±½n, where s¤
n is a strategy in Sn(P) and ½n is a mixed strategy whose supportON FORWARD INDUCTION 15
is Rn. Since s¤
n is a best reply against every equilibrium in §(P), t±
n is an approximate best
reply against equilibria in §(P) when ± is small, a fact we need in the next section. De¯ne a
game G± in normal form by adding to the normal form G of ¡ the redundant pure strategy
t±
n for each player n for whom Rn is not empty. In particular, t±
n is added i® there is some
information set in Hn(P) where some non-equilibrium action is part of a relevant strategy.
(In Example 2.1 the redundant strategy t±
n for player I is the one shown in Figure 1 with
parameter ± = 1=4; and in Example 2.2 it is the strategy QX with parameter ± = 1=9.)
Next we de¯ne a game ¡± in extensive form whose normal form is equivalent to G±, and
thus also ¡± is equivalent to ¡. A path of play in ¡± consists of choices by players in an initial
stage, followed by a path of play in a copy of ¡. In the subsequent play of ¡, no player is
informed about choices made by other players in the initial stage of ¡±. The rules of ¡± are
the following. If Rn is empty then in ¡± player n chooses among all his equivalence classes in
En(P) in the initial stage. If Rn is not empty then in the initial stage he ¯rst chooses whether
to play an equivalence class in E±
n(P) or not. If he decides to play something in E±
n(P) then
he chooses one of these equivalence classes; or if he chooses not to, then he proceeds to a
second information set where he chooses to play either the redundant pure strategy t±
n or
an equivalence class among those not in E±
n(P). After these initial stages for all players, ¡±
evolves the same as ¡ does, i.e. a copy of ¡ follows each sequence of choices in the initial
stage. In ¡± the information sets in ¡ are expanded to encompass appropriate copies of ¡
to represent that no player ever observes what others chose in the initial stage; thus, the
information revealed in ¡± is exactly the same as in ¡. The information set hn 2 Hn in ¡
has in ¡± for each En 2 En(P) an expanded copy h±
n(En), and a copy h±
n(t±
n). Nature makes
the choice at the expansions of those information sets in Hn(P) (but not at expansions of
those in Hn n Hn(P)) according to the equivalence class chosen in the initial stage, or at all
expansions of information sets in Hn if t±
n was chosen. That is, if n chooses t±
n at the second
information set then nature automatically implements the entire strategy; but if he chooses
some equivalence class En in En(P) then nature implements actions prescribed by En at each
h±
n(En) when hn 2 Hn(P) and leaves to him to choose at those that are not, if and when
they occur.
A pure strategy sn 2 Sn can be implemented in ¡± by ¯rst choosing En(sn) in the initial
stage and then making the choices prescribed by sn at all hn 2 HnnHn(P). And, any
strategy in ¡± that begins by choosing some equivalence class En in the ¯rst stage ends
up implementing some sn 2 En. Observe too that the redundant pure strategy t±
n, when
available, ends up implementing the mixture given by t±
n. Thus, it is obvious that G± is
obtained from the normal form of ¡± by deleting some redundant pure strategies in the16 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
latter that are duplicates of other pure strategies. Hence, by a slight abuse of notation, we
view G± as the normal form of ¡±. The game ¡± is now easily seen to be equivalent to ¡.
Suppose hn 2 HnnHn(P). If an equivalence class En contains a pure strategy sn that
enables hn in ¡, then in ¡± the corresponding strategy sn|i.e. choosing En in the initial
stage and then making sn's choices at all h0
n = 2 Hn(P)|enables h±
n(En). Conversely, if En
does not contain such an sn then there is an information set vn 2 Hn(P) that precedes hn, is
enabled by En, and where En makes a choice di®erent from the one that leads to hn. Thus,
in ¡± nature's choice at v±
n(En) prevents h±
n(En) from being reached. Therefore, to analyze
the game ¡± we need to consider only information sets h±
n(En) where En contains a strategy
that enables hn in ¡. For simplicity in this section and the next, by an information set
h±
n(En) in ¡± of player n, we mean an hn 2 HnnHn(P) and an En that contains a strategy
that enables hn in ¡.
Now assume the game has two players. We use m to denote the opponent of player n.
Suppose that En and E0
n are two equivalence classes that contain strategies that enable some
hn = 2 Hn(P). The information that n has at h±
n(En) and h±
n(E0
n) about m's choices are the
same at both information sets. Therefore, a pure strategy of m in G± enables one i® it
enables the other. In particular, in a sequential equilibrium (~ b±; ~ ¹±) of ¡±, player n's belief
at h±
n(En) is independent of En and can thus be denoted ~ ¹±
n(¢jhn).
Likewise, suppose ~ ¾±
m is a mixed strategy of m in G± that enables some information set
h±
n(En) of n. Then ~ ¾±
m induces a conditional distribution ~ ¿±
m over the pure strategies of m in
G± that enable h±
n(En). Let ¾m and ¿m be the equivalent strategies in G. It is easily checked
that ¿m is the conditional distribution induced by ¾m over the pure strategies that enable
hn. And, an action an at h±
n(En) in ¡± is optimal against ~ ¿±
m i® it is optimal against ¿m in ¡.
6. Statement and Proof the Theorem
In this section we show for two-player games with generic payo®s that an invariant back-
ward induction outcome satis¯es forward induction.
The notion of genericity we invoke is the following. Let G be the space of all games
generated by assigning payo®s to the terminal nodes of a ¯xed two-player game tree. In [19]
we show that there exists a closed lower-dimensional subset G0 such that for each game not
in G0 there are ¯nitely many outcomes of Nash equilibria. For technical reasons, in Appendix
A we construct another closed lower-dimensional subset denoted G1. Now a game is generic
if it is in the complement of both G0 and G1. With this, the formal statement of our theorem
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Theorem 6.1. An outcome of a two-player game with perfect recall and generic payo®s
satis¯es forward induction if it is invariant for the solution concept sequential equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that ¡ is a two-player game in extensive form with perfect recall and generic
payo®s. Assume also that P is an invariant sequential equilibrium outcome of ¡, i.e. each
game equivalent to ¡ has a sequential equilibrium whose outcome is equivalent to P. Because
¡ is equivalent to the game ¡± de¯ned in Section 5, ¡± has a sequential equilibrium (~ b±; ~ ¹±)
whose outcome is equivalent to P. Because ~ ¹± is fully consistent, there exists a sequence
f~ b±
"g of pro¯les of completely mixed behavioral strategies that converges as " # 0 to ~ b± and
a corresponding equivalent sequence f~ ¾±
"g of pro¯les of completely mixed strategies in the
normal form G± that converges to some pro¯le ~ ¾± and such that the belief pro¯le ~ ¹± is the
limit of the beliefs derived from the sequence f~ ¾±
"g.
Since ~ b± induces an outcome that is equivalent to P, the strategy ~ ¾±, which is equivalent
to ~ b±, has its support in Sn(P) for each n: indeed, a strategy in Tn(P), or the strategy t±
n
when available, chooses a non-equilibrium action at some hn 2 Hn(P) in ¡ that it enables.
Therefore, under ~ b± each player n in the initial stage assigns positive probability only to
choices of equivalence classes in E±
n(P).
Corresponding to the sequence f~ ¾±
"g there is an equivalent sequence f¾±
"g of pro¯les of
mixed strategies in the normal form of ¡ for which there is an equivalent sequence fb±
"g of
pro¯les of behavioral strategies in the extensive form of ¡. Let ¹±
" be the pro¯le of beliefs
induced by ¾±
". Denote selected limit points of these sequences by ¾±, b±, and ¹±. By
construction, ¾± 2 §(P), b± 2 B(P) and ¹± is fully consistent. It follows from our remarks
at the end of the previous section that for each n and hn = 2 Hn(P): ¹±
n(¢jhn) is equivalent to
~ ¹±
n(¢jhn), and an action at hn is optimal in ¡ against ¹±
n(¢jhn) i® it is optimal in ¡± at h±
n(En)
against ~ ¹±
n(¢jhn) for the corresponding copies in ¡±.
Next we argue that (b±;¹±) is a weakly sequential equilibrium of ¡. Let hn be an infor-
mation set of player n that b±
n enables. We need to show that the choice made by b±
n at hn
is optimal against ¹±
n(¢jhn). If hn belongs to Hn(P) then ¹n(¢jhn) is derived from ¾±
m and
obviously b±
n chooses optimally at hn. Suppose that hn = 2 Hn(P). Let an be an arbitrary
action at hn that is chosen with positive probability by b±
n. Since hn is enabled by b±
n there
exists a pure strategy sn in the support of ¾± that enables hn and chooses an there. Since ¾±
is equivalent to ~ ¾±, in ~ b± player n with positive probability chooses En(sn) and then makes
the choices prescribed by sn. Sequential rationality of an at h±
n(En) implies its optimality
against ~ ¹±
n(¢jhn). Hence, from the previous paragraph an is optimal against ¹±
n(¢jhn) in ¡.
Since an was arbitrary, this shows that (b±;¹±) is a weakly sequential equilibrium of ¡.18 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
For some sequence ± # 0, (¾±;b±;¹±) converges to some limit point (¾;b;¹). Clearly,
¾ 2 §(P), b 2 B(P), ¹ is fully consistent, and (b;¹) 2 BM(P) is a weakly sequential
equilibrium of ¡ because BM(P) is a closed set.
It remains to prove the forward induction property for the belief pro¯le ¹. For each n for
whom Rn is not empty, and each ±, let f~ ¿±
n;"g be the sequence of conditional distributions
over T ±
n ´ Tn(P) [ ft±
n g induced by the sequence f~ ¾±
"g and let ~ ¿±
n be a limit point. The
sequence f~ ¿±
n;"g and therefore its limit are determined by choices made after n chooses in
the initial stage to avoid equivalence classes in E±
n(P). Therefore, the probability of t±
n is
nonzero under ~ ¿±
n i® t±
n is chosen with positive probability at n's second information set in
the initial stage; and, the probability of sn 2 Tn(P) is nonzero under ~ ¿±
n i® n chooses E(sn)
with positive probability at this stage and then implements the choices of sn with positive
probability after this choice. Express ~ ¿±
n as a convex combination ~ ®±
nt±
n + [1 ¡ ~ ®±
n]^ ¿±
n where
the support of ^ ¿±
n is contained in Tn(P). Then sequential rationality at the initial stage after
rejecting equivalence classes in E±
n(P) and at subsequent information sets have the following
two implications. First, ~ ®±
n is nonzero only if t±
n is at least as good a reply as each sn 2 Tn(P)
against b±
m. Second, if ~ ®±
n < 1 then a strategy sn 2 Tn(P) belongs to the support of ^ ¿±
n only if
it is at least as good a reply against b±
m as the other strategies in T ±
n; and for each hn = 2 Hn(P)
enabled by sn in ¡, the choice prescribed by sn at hn is optimal at h±
n(En(sn)) given the
belief ~ ¹±
n(¢jhn). If an information set h±
m(Em) of player m is enabled by ~ ¿±
n but not by ~ ¾±
n
then the beliefs ~ ¹±
m(¢jhm) are derived from ~ ¿±
n.
The sequence f~ ¿±
n;"g induces a corresponding sequence of equivalent strategies in G that
induces a sequence of conditional distributions over Tn(P). Because t±
n = [1 ¡ ±]s¤
n + ±½n,




[1 ¡ ~ ®±
n]^ ¿±






n = ~ ®±
n±=[~ ®±
n± +(1¡ ~ ®±
n)]. Obviously if an information set hm
of player m is enabled by ¿±
n but not by ¾±
n then the beliefs ¹±
m(¢jhm) are those derived from
¿±
n.
Passing to a subsequence if necessary, the limit ¿n of the sequence ¿±
n can be expressed as
a convex combination ¿n = ®n½ + [1 ¡ ®n]^ ¿n where ®n and ^ ¿n are the limits of ®±
n and ^ ¿±
n,
respectively. As in the previous paragraph, if an information set hm of player m is enabled
by ¿n but not by ¾n then the beliefs ¹m(¢jhm) are those derived from ¿n.
Claim 6.2. (1) ®n > 0. (2) If ®n < 1 then the support of ^ ¿n consists of strategies in Rn. In
particular, for each sn in its support and each information set hn that sn enables, the choice
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Proof of Claim. We prove (2) ¯rst. Suppose ®n < 1. Let sn be a strategy in Tn(P) that is
not optimal in reply to (b;¹). We show that sn is not in the support of ^ ¿±
n for all su±ciently
small ±, which proves the second statement. Let hn be an information set that sn enables
where its action is not optimal. If hn 2 Hn(P) then every strategy in En(sn) is suboptimal
against bm. Because s¤
n, the strategy that belongs to Sn(P) and to the support of t±
n for all
±, is optimal against b±
m for all ±, and b is the limit of b±, for su±ciently small ± the strategy
t±
n does better against b± than every strategy in the equivalence class En(sn). At the second
information set in the initial stage of ¡± where n decides among the redundant strategy
t±
n and equivalence classes not in E±
n(P), sequential rationality implies that he chooses the
equivalence class En(sn) with zero probability for all small ±. As we remarked above, this
implies that for such ±, the probability of sn is zero in ^ ¿±
n.
If hn = 2 Hn(P) then there exists another strategy s0
n in the equivalence class En(sn) that
agrees with sn elsewhere but prescribes an optimal continuation at hn. Obviously, for all
small ±, s0
n is a better reply than sn in reply to (b±;¹±). But then sequential rationality at
the copy h±
n(En(sn)) of hn in ¡± for such small ± implies that he would choose according to
s0
n there and not sn. Again, the probability of sn under ^ ¿±
n is zero for small ±. Thus every
strategy in the support of ^ ¿n is optimal in reply to (b;¹) and therefore is a relevant strategy.
It remains to show that ®n 6= 0. Suppose to the contrary that ®n = 0. Let ^ Sn be the set of
strategies in the support of either ¾n or ^ ¿n. Let ^ Hm be the collection of information sets in
Hm enabled by strategies in ^ Sn. Because (b;¹) is a weakly sequential equilibrium we obtain
the following properties for each information set hm in ^ Hm of player m: if hm is enabled by
¾n then the action prescribed by bm at hm is optimal against ¾n; if hm is enabled only by
^ ¿n then the action prescribed by bm is optimal against ^ ¿n. Therefore, for each small ´ > 0
there exists a perturbation ¡(´) of ¡, where only m's payo®s are perturbed, such that: ¾m
is optimal against ¾n(´) ´ [1¡´]¾n+´^ ¿n in ¡(´); and ¡(´) converges to ¡ as ´ goes to zero.
As we argued above, ^ ¿n is optimal against ¾m in ¡. Therefore, for all small ´, (¾m;¾n(´))
is an equilibrium of ¡(´). Since ¡ is generic, it belongs to some component C of the open
set G n G0, where G0 is the set constructed in Appendix A. Therefore, the sequence ¡(´) is
in C for all small ´. By Lemma A.1 in Appendix A, there exists a strategy ¿0
n such that:
(i) the support of ¿0
n equals ^ Sn; and (ii) ¾m is a best reply against ¿0
n in ¡. Therefore, for
all 0 6 " 6 1, (¾m;(1 ¡ ")¾n + "¿0
n) is an equilibrium of ¡. But because the strategies in
the support of ^ ¿n choose a non-equilibrium action at some hn 2 Hn(P) that they enable, all
these equilibria result in di®erent outcomes. This is impossible because the payo®s in ¡ are
generic and therefore ¡ has only ¯nitely many equilibrium outcomes [19]. Thus ®n 6= 0. ¤20 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Now we prove that P satis¯es forward induction by showing that (b;¹) induces beliefs
that assign positive probability only to relevant strategies. Let hn be an information set
of n that is enabled by bn. If hn 2 Hn(P) then obviously n's belief over the continuation
strategies of m is the one derived from ¾m, and strategies in the support of ¾m are obviously
relevant. If hn = 2 Hn(P) then the only strategies of m that enable hn are those in Tm(P). If
there is no strategy in Rm that enables hn then there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, the
subset of strategies in Rm that enable hn is not empty and then the strategy ¿m, which by
the above Claim has Rm as its support, enables hn. Therefore, ¹n(¢jhn) is derived from ¿m,
and in this case too, the restriction on beliefs imposed by forward induction holds. Thus P
satis¯es forward induction. ¤
Theorem 6.1 resolves a conjecture by Hillas and Kohlberg [27, x13.6]. Its remarkable
aspect is that backward induction and invariance su±ce for forward induction|if there are
two players and payo®s are generic. No further assumption about rationality of behavior or
plausibility of beliefs is invoked, nor are perturbations of strategies invoked as in studies of
perfect equilibria and stable sets of equilibria. And, for signaling games there is no reliance on
Cho and Kreps' [10, p. 181] auxiliary scenario in which the sender makes a `speech' that the
other's intransigent belief ignores the fact that a deviation would be rational provided merely
that the receiver recognizes and acts on its implications by excluding irrelevant strategies
from the support of his belief.
Invariance excludes one particular presentation e®ect by requiring that the outcome should
not depend on whether a mixed strategy is treated as an additional pure strategy. One in-
terpretation of forward induction is that it excludes another presentation e®ect by requiring
that the outcome does not depend on irrelevant strategies. Indeed, van Damme [16, p. 1555]
interprets forward induction as akin to the axiom called `independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives' in social choice theory. In the case of a game the analog of social choice is the outcome
(the probability distribution on terminal nodes) and the irrelevant alternatives are players'
irrelevant strategies.
7. Reny's Interpretation of Forward Induction
An implication of Theorem 6.1 is that there is no con°ict between backward and forward
induction if one adopts the decision-theoretic principle of invariance. This conclusion depends
on our de¯nitions of relevant strategies and forward induction outcomes; e.g. we interpret
forward induction as a re¯nement of weakly sequential equilibrium that ensures the outcome
does not depend on one player believing the other is using an irrelevant strategy at a relevant
information set.ON FORWARD INDUCTION 21
In this section we compare our de¯nitions with the principle alternative, represented by the
discussion in Reny [41, x4]. He invokes `best response motivated inferences' as an instance of
`forward induction logic' and concludes from an example that it can con°ict with backward
induction.
Although he does not propose an explicit de¯nition, the main ingredients di®er from our
formulation as follows. Our de¯nitions are narrow|we interpret forward induction as a
property of an outcome of a weakly sequential equilibrium, and ask only that the outcome
results from one in which the support of a player's belief at a relevant information set is
con¯ned to relevant strategies, which we limit to those strategies that are optimal replies
to some weakly sequential equilibrium. Reny's view applies forward induction reasoning
directly to players' strategies rather than outcomes, and applies it to more information sets
and more strategies. At every information set not excluded by a player's own strategy, he
asks only that the support of the player's belief is con¯ned to those strategies reaching that
information set for which there are some beliefs of the other player that would justify using
them.
The implications of Reny's expanded view of forward induction reasoning are illustrated
by his motivating example [41, Figure 3]. The top panel of Figure 4 shows a game in which
players I and II alternately choose whether to end the game. Reny argues that this example
shows a tension between forward and backward induction. He observes that I's choice of the
pure strategy D strictly dominates Ad. He infers from this that forward induction should
require that if I rejects D then II must believe that I's strategy is surely Aa, and hence
II's only optimal reply is Ad. But backward induction requires each player to choose d,
and before that D, which contradicts the seeming implication of forward induction that II's
strategy should be Ad. From this he concludes that II's backward induction strategy is \ren-
dered `irrational' " and thus \the inappropriateness, indeed the inapplicability of the usual
backward programming argument in the presence of best response motivated inferences."
[41, p. 637, italics in original].
Our analysis of this example di®ers in two respects. First, I's only relevant strategy is to
choose D initially, so forward induction according to our de¯nition has no implications for II's
beliefs. This is so because our de¯nitions identify outcomes resulting from the conjunction
of rational play and beliefs that other players are playing rationally; hence we apply them
only to information sets reached by rational play as represented by relevant strategies. In
contrast, Reny applies forward induction to the belief of a player when the other player's
strategy is an optimal reply to an arbitrary belief. In the top panel of Figure 4, for player
II to choose A requires that either II believes I is irrational, or II believes that I believes II22 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
A A
D D d d
a a
A A



















2,0 0,1 1,0 0,2
2,0 1,0






Figure 4. Top panel: Reny's example of a game between players I and II.
Bottom panel: The game modi¯ed so that player I can choose the redundant
strategy x(±) after rejecting D.
is irrational. Speci¯cally, for II at her ¯rst decision node to believe that I's strategy is Ad
amounts to believing that I is irrational (because D dominates Ad as noted above); and for
II to believe that I's strategy is Aa and that I is rational requires II to ascribe to I a belief
that II's strategy is Aa with high probability, which is an irrational strategy for II (because
at II's second decision node the continuation d dominates the continuation a).
Our view is that a coherent theory of rational play and beliefs that others are playing
rationally (i.e. a theory consistent with strong belief in rationality) is possible only with the
more circumscribed de¯nition of relevant strategies that we propose. Note, however, that we
admit fewer strategies as relevant but restrict beliefs only at relevant information sets, so our
de¯nition of forward induction is neither stronger nor weaker than Reny's interpretation.
The other respect in which our analysis di®ers is that we invoke invariance. The bottom
panel of Figure 4 shows an expanded extensive form in which player I can reject D and then
choose between action A or the new pure strategy x(±) for some probability ± 2 (1=2;1).ON FORWARD INDUCTION 23
(See [20, x2.3] for a similar example.) The two information sets indicate that player II cannot
know whether I chose A or x(±) after rejecting D. The branch points indicated by black
boxes refer to moves by nature, i.e. nature takes over and implements the strategy x(±) using
the indicated probabilities (1 ¡ ±;±) and (0;1) at I's ¯rst and second information sets after
I chooses x(±). Note that x(±) is redundant because it is replicated by the mixed strategy
that chooses between D and Aa with probabilities 1 ¡ ± and ±.
In the expanded game it is somewhat arbitrary whether one supposes that I can choose
x(±) before or after D. We use the latter because then it is easy to construct the unique Nash
equilibrium of the subgame that begins after I rejects D. This is a sequential equilibrium in
which I chooses x(±) with probability 1=[1 + ±] and otherwise chooses A and then d; and, if
A occurs then II chooses D with probability 2± ¡1 and otherwise A and then d. Consistent
with Bayes' Rule, II's strategy is supported by beliefs at her ¯rst and second information
sets that the conditional probabilities are respectively 1=2 and 1 that I chose x(±). As ±
approaches 1/2, II's strategy in this equilibrium converges to Ad, and as ± approaches 1, to
D, which correspond to the two strategies by II that Reny considers. (When ± = 1=2 the
Nash equilibria of the subgame require only that I's probability of x(1=2) is at least 2/3,
and II's belief changes accordingly; and when ± = 1 the game is essentially the same as the
original game since x(1) is a duplicate of Aa.)
Thus we ¯nd that II might be indi®erent between her backward induction strategy D
and her strategy Ad that Reny concludes is implied by best response motivated inferences.
Therefore, Reny's conclusion that II's backward induction strategy is rendered irrational
depends on rejecting invariance as a decision-theoretic principle.
Because Theorem 6.1 is restricted to games with two players and generic payo®s, it does
not establish that our de¯nitions of relevant strategies and forward induction outcomes are
surely the right ones for general games. But it suggests that similar de¯nitions can enable
`forward induction reasoning' to be justi¯ed by decision-theoretic criteria.
8. Economic Applications
We conclude by mentioning some prominent applications of forward induction, although
in every case the authors use minimal assumptions or equilibrium selection criteria that are
weaker than forward induction as we de¯ne it in Section 3.
One of the main applications of forward induction in economics is to game-theoretic models
of entry deterrence and contestability in dynamic oligopolies with high ¯xed costs; e.g.
Ponssard [40]. These models resemble Example 2.1 in that there is one equilibrium in which
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to meet entry with competition, but in another equilibrium (the one whose outcome satis¯es
forward induction) the high-cost ¯rm exits after the low-cost ¯rm enters. Ben-Porath and
Dekel [5] study cases in which merely the option to engage in costly actions prior to a
subgame selects an equilibrium of the subgame if one invokes iterative deletion of weakly
dominated strategies. Hauk and Hurkens [25] study a version in which the forward induction
outcome results from an evolutionary model.
Other applications resemble Example 2.2. These include explicit signaling games such as
limit pricing as in Bagwell [2] and Milgrom and Roberts [37], and signaling of quality in
labor markets by acquiring educational credentials as in Spence [42] and in product markets
by advertising or warranties as in Bagwell and Ramey [3] and Milgrom and Roberts [38].
In many of these models, with su±cient regularity assumptions and a su±ciently rich set of
signaling strategies for the sender, the outcomes of pooling and partially pooling equilibria do
not satisfy forward induction, and thus forward induction selects the outcome of a separating
equilibrium in which signals reveal players' types. This is to be expected since forward
induction ensures maximum opportunity for credible signaling of private information by
rejecting outcomes that depend on others' implausible or intransigent beliefs.
Among the important extensions of signaling games are dynamic models of bargaining
by Admati and Perry [1], Compte and Jehiel [12], Cramton [13], Cramton and Tracy [14],
Feinberg and Skrzypacz [17], and Grossman and Perry [22, 23] among others. In several
of these the forward induction outcome results from a separating equilibrium in which the
informed party credibly signals his type via su±cient delay in responding with a serious
countero®er. This outcome di®ers from outcomes of equilibria with partial pooling in which
the uninformed party screens sets of types of the informed party via successively better o®ers.
GÄ ul and Sonnenschein [24] assume three conditions (most importantly that the informed
party's strategy is stationary) that imply restriction to screening equilibria, and from this
they obtain a proof of the Coase conjecture. But this result is not implied by equilibria
of the model by Admati and Perry and the model by Cramton in which both parties have
private information, and not necessarily by the model of Feinberg and Skrzypacz in which the
uninformed party's probability distribution over the other's type is itself private information.
We caution that Theorem 6.1's restrictions to games with two players and generic payo®s
have analogs in applications of forward induction. In Example 2.2 both outcomes QQ-R and
BB-R satisfy forward induction if the two types of player I are treated as distinct players in
a three-player game. Chen, Kartik, and Sobel [9, p. 118] emphasize that criteria like forward
induction have limited power to select among outcomes of `cheap talk' signaling games in
which the sender's payo®s do not depend on his action and hence are nongeneric. However,ON FORWARD INDUCTION 25
they show for a class of games with one-dimensional types that the `most informative' equi-
librium is a limit of equilibria of perturbed games in which the sender's payo®s depend on
his action, provided that in these equilibria the sender's action is weakly increasing in his
type and the receiver's action is weakly increasingly in the sender's action.
8.1. Final Remarks. We do not o®er a new realm of applications. We do o®er an ex-
planation of why forward induction is a desirable re¯nement of sequential equilibrium in
two-player games with generic payo®s. Theorem 6.1 says that if an outcome does not satisfy
forward induction|that is, depends on one player believing the other is using an irrelevant
strategy|then there is an equivalent game in which this outcome results only from Nash
equilibria and not from any sequential equilibrium. Failure of an economic model to pre-
dict an outcome that satis¯es forward induction could motivate reconsideration of whether
the essential features of the strategic situation are well represented by the speci¯c extensive
form used in the model, or if one has con¯dence in the model then this prediction might
be rejected because for the same model there necessarily exists another prediction that does
satisfy forward induction.
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Appendix A. Technical Lemma
Given an extensive form with two players, for each player n let Sn and §n be n's sets
of pure and mixed strategies, and let S = S1 £ S2 and § = §1 £ §2 be the product sets
of pro¯les. Let G be the Euclidean space of extensive-form games generated by assigning
payo®s to the players at the terminal nodes of the given extensive form.
Lemma A.1. There exists a closed, lower-dimensional, semi-algebraic set G1 of G such that
for each connected component C of G nG1, the following holds: if for some game ¡ 2 C and
pro¯le ¾ 2 § the set of pro¯les of pure strategies that are the players' optimal replies to ¾
is T = T1 £ T2 ½ S, then for every game ¡0 2 C there exists a pro¯le ¾0 2 § with the same
support as ¾ and such that in ¡0 the set of pure optimal replies to ¾0 is T.
Proof. Let X = G£§ and let p : X ! G be the natural projection. For each pair R = R1£R2
and T = T1£T2 of subsets of S, let X(R;T) be the set of (¡;¾) in X such that, for each n, Rn
is the support of ¾n and Tn is the set of n's pure optimal replies in ¡ to the mixed strategy ¾m
of the other player. By the generic local triviality theorem [8] there exists a closed, lower-
dimensional, semi-algebraic subset G1 of G such that for each connected component C of
GnG1 there exist: (i) a semi-algebraic ¯bre F, (ii) for each pair (R;T) a subset F(R;T) of F,
and (iii) a homeomorphism h : C £F ! p¡1(C) with the properties that (a) p±h(¡;f) = ¡
for all ¡ 2 C, and (b) h maps C £ F(R;T) homeomorphically onto p¡1(C) \ X(R;T) for
each (R;T).
Suppose T is the set of pro¯les of pure optimal replies to ¾ in a game ¡ 2 C. Let R be
the support of ¾. Then (¡;¾) belongs to X(R;T). Therefore there exists f 2 F(R;T) such
that h(¡;f) = (¡;¾). For each ¡0 2 C, let ¾0(f) be the unique mixed strategy in § for which28 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
h(¡0;f) = (¡0;¾0(f)). Then the support of ¾0(f) is R and the set of pro¯les of pure optimal
replies in ¡0 to ¾0(f) is T. ¤
Appendix B. Forward Induction in the Normal Form
The classical view in game theory is that the normal form of a game is su±cient to capture
all strategically signi¯cant aspects. Hence the question arises as to whether we can state a
comparable version of forward induction for a game in normal form. Here we provide one
such de¯nition.
The following three components of De¯nition 3.4 for a game in extensive form need to
be rephrased in terms of the normal form: (1) weakly sequential equilibria, (2) relevant
strategies, and (3) restriction of beliefs to those induced by relevant strategies whenever
possible. As will be seen below, if the sequential rationality requirement in the de¯nition of
weakly sequential equilibria is strengthened slightly (and only for nongeneric games), then
the corresponding de¯nition of forward induction has a normal-form counterpart.
Given a game G in normal form, let ¾ be a pro¯le of players' mixed strategies and let b be
an equivalent pro¯le in behavioral strategies for an extensive-form game ¡ with that normal
form. Reny [41, Prop. 1] shows that ¾ is a normal-form perfect equilibrium of G i® in ¡
there exists a sequence b" of completely mixed pro¯les converging to b such that for each
player n and each information set hn that bn does not exclude, the action prescribed by bn
at hn is optimal against b"
¡n for all small ". Thus the di®erence between weakly sequential
equilibrium and normal-form perfect equilibrium is analogous to that between sequential
equilibrium and extensive-form perfect equilibrium: one requires optimality only in reply
to the limit, while the other requires optimality in reply to the sequence as well. Reny
also shows that weakly sequential equilibria coincide with normal-form perfect equilibria
for generic extensive-form games. Therefore, a perfect equilibrium seems to be the right
normal-form analog of a weakly sequential equilibrium.
Suppose §¤ is a set of Nash equilibria of G. (To ¯x ideas, §¤ could be the set §(P) of
equilibria inducing an outcome P in an extensive-form version of the game, but to allow
applications to nongeneric games we want to allow multiple outcomes.) In the extensive-
form case, we said that a strategy was relevant if it was optimal against a strategy-belief
pair inducing the given outcome. But as noted above, if we insist on optimality along the
sequence then the appropriate normal-form de¯nition of a relevant strategy becomes: a
strategy is relevant if it is optimal against a sequence of "-perfect equilibria converging to
an equilibrium in §¤.ON FORWARD INDUCTION 29
Finally, we turn to belief restrictions. The idea in the extensive-form case is that if an
information set hn of player n is reached by a pro¯le of relevant strategies of his opponents
then he assigns zero probability to continuations that are enabled only by pro¯les that
contain an irrelevant strategy for one of the other players. Let R¡n(hn) be the set of pro¯les
of relevant strategies of n's opponents that reach such an hn. If we use a sequence ¾"
normal-form pro¯les to generate players' beliefs and their continuation strategies, then the
belief restriction says that n's belief at hn and the continuation strategies of his opponents
should be obtained from the limit of the sequence of conditional distributions over R¡n(hn)
induced by the sequence ¾". That is, the beliefs at all information sets of all players that are
reached by relevant strategies can be generated from the sequence of conditional distributions
con¯ned to relevant strategies.
Because we insist on optimality along the sequence, what we obtain is a perfect equi-
librium with a restriction on the form of its representation as a lexicographic probability
system, as in Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel [7, Prop. 4,7]. The restriction is that any
pro¯le that includes an irrelevant strategy for some player should occur later in the lexico-
graphic sequence than those that include only relevant strategies. This implements the basic
requirement that each player believes the other is using a relevant strategy so long as that
hypothesis is tenable. Thus, we are led to the following de¯nition:
De¯nition B.1 (Normal-Form Forward Induction). A set of Nash equilibria satis¯es normal-
form forward induction if it contains a perfect equilibrium whose lexicographic representa-
tion has all pro¯les of relevant strategies occurring before all pro¯les that include irrelevant
strategies.
In general this is a stronger requirement than the one in the text. But for a generic
two-player extensive-form game with perfect recall it can be shown that the set of weakly
sequential equilibria inducing an outcome P satis¯es the above de¯nition i® P satis¯es for-
ward induction as de¯ned in the text. The reason for this equivalence is similar to the rea-
son that weakly sequential equilibria and normal-form perfect equilibria coincide for generic
extensive-form games as established by Reny [41, Prop. 1]. An implication is that the analog
of Theorem 6.1 is true with this de¯nition of forward induction, i.e. the set of Nash equilibria
resulting in an invariant sequential equilibrium outcome of a two-player game with perfect
recall and generic payo®s satis¯es normal-form forward induction.30 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
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